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A POWER STRUGGLE OF MYTHIC
PROPORTION: IN THE WORLD OF ERISA,
ARE RETIREMENT PLAN ADMINISTRATORS
THE REAL GODS OF OLYMPUS?
Nathan R. Ross∗
“Shall we all wield the power of kings? We cán not,
and many masters are no good at all.
Let there be one commander, one authority . . . .”1
I. INTRODUCTION
A. How This Divine War Affects Mortals
Here sits a middle-aged woman, recently divorced from her spouse
of thirty-five years and without professional experience or any
marketable skills for the modern workplace.2 She spent those thirty-five
years raising a family and maintaining a home while her husband
worked. Post-divorce, she is alone and without savings or financial
assistance. She will likely have two financial hurdles facing her: (1) she
needs to find a job; and (2) she needs to make up for thirty-five years of
saving for retirement. This Article deals with the latter problem: How
does she make up for those lost thirty-five years? To most, this has not
been a matter of great concern since 1984 when Congress passed the
Retirement Equity Act (“REA”),3 which allows state courts to award a
former spouse portions of his or her ex-spouse’s retirement benefits that
are covered in retirement plans under the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (“ERISA”).4
However, what happens if a month after the divorce becomes final
her former spouse dies, but the plan administrator of her former
spouse’s retirement account has yet to split the assets? Does this matter?
Should it matter? Is she any less entitled to the assets the court would
ordinarily award her simply because her former spouse died?
∗

Nathan R. Ross is a proud graduate of Florida Coastal School of Law and an Assistant
State Attorney in the Fourth Judicial Circuit of Florida. I would like to thank my wife
Ashley; she deserves the utmost praise for her advice, patience, and understanding while I
toiled away writing this Article. Thank you for your constant support and companionship.
1
HOMER, THE ILIAD 36 (Robert Fitzgerald trans., Farrar, Straus & Giroux 2004) (1974)
(emphasis added).
2
The author created this hypothetical to illustrate the financial issues associated with
retirement savings upon divorce.
3
Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-397, 98 Stat. 1426 (codified at 26 U.S.C.
§§ 401, 402, 414, 417).
4
Employee Retirement Income Savings Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 (2006).

529

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2012

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 46, No. 2 [2012], Art. 7

530

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

Surprisingly, there is no uniform answer to this question. Under current
jurisprudence, the answer to this question depends on a combination of
things, such as the jurisdiction in which one lives and one’s former
spouse’s work location. The Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits allow one
to file the necessary documents in court after his or her ex-spouse dies
(or experiences another qualifying event, such as bankruptcy or
However, in the Ninth and Tenth Circuits, one’s
retirement).5
entitlement to benefits will also depend on where one’s former spouse
worked.6 For cases arising in the Third, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits, a
petitioner’s claim is fixed at the death of a former spouse, thereby
denying any award after the ex-spouse dies.7
This may seem like a combination of events that is both highly
unlikely and of little consequence, but that could not be further from the
truth. Going forward, and for the foreseeable future, this problem will
continue to grow in both frequency and significance. Since the adoption
of ERISA in 1974, and its subsequent amendment in 1984, the likelihood
of Americans getting a divorce has increased dramatically.8 Coupling

See Patton v. Denver Post Corp., 326 F.3d 1148, 1149–50 (10th Cir. 2003) (citations
omitted) (affirming the district court’s grant of summary judgment when a spouse sought a
declaration “that a state domestic relations order granting her survivor benefits in her
former husband’s pension plan was a ‘qualified domestic relations order’ (QDRO) under
[ERISA]” when the state court “entered the domestic relations order after [her former
husband’s] death, but nunc pro tunc to the date of their divorce eleven years prior to his
death, because it concerned benefits from a plan [that was unknown] at the time of the
divorce settlement”); Hogan v. Raytheon, Co., 302 F.3d 854, 855 (8th Cir. 2002) (entitling
former spouse to receive her former husband’s ERISA plan benefits); In re Gendreau, 122
F.3d 815, 817 (9th Cir. 1997) (affirming the district court’s grant of summary judgment
when a Chapter 7 debtor sought a declaratory judgment that a divorce decree award to the
debtor’s former spouse of a portion of the debtor’s pension plan was not a dischargeable
debt).
6
See Patton, 326 F.3d at 1151 (deferring in part to the plan summary to determine
whether notice prior to death is needed); Trs. of the Dirs. Guild of Am.-Producer Pension
Benefts Plans, 234 F.3d 415, 418 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating responsibility for determining
whether a domestic relations order (“DRO”) is a qualified domestic relations order
(“QDRO”) rests with the plan).
7
Samaroo v. Samaroo, 193 F.3d 185, 191 (3d Cir. 1999); Hopkins v. AT&T Global Info.
Solutions Co., 105 F.3d 153, 156 (4th Cir. 1997) (stating interest in the plan must vest at
retirement); Guzman v. Commonwealth Edison Co., No. 99-C-582, 2000 WL 1898846, at *2
(N.D. Ill. Dec. 28, 2000).
8
Although the actual divorce rates have remained relatively constant since the
enactment of ERISA, the population of the country has grown from 213 million in 1974 to
an estimated 312 million in 2011. Accordingly, the number of people getting divorced has
increased by forty-four percent. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, RESIDENT POPULATION PLUS
ARMED FORCES OVERSEES—ESTIMATES BY AGE, SEX, AND RACE: JULY 1, 1974 (1974), available
at http://www.census.gov/popest/data/national/asrh/pre-1980/tables/PE-11-1974.pdf
(providing the estimated population data for 1974); U.S. & World Population Clocks, U.S.
5
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this with an aging baby boomer population means the dilemmas
discussed in this Article are likely to occur with more frequency.9
Juxtaposing the increased likelihood with the immense amount of
retirement benefits contained in ERISA-sponsored retirement plans
means the resolution to this problem will determine the distribution of a
vast amount of wealth.10
This Article will attempt to reconcile this dilemma first by reviewing
the origins of the legislation at the heart of the matter—ERISA and the
subsequent REA amendment.11 Then it will delve into the decisions
interpreting ERISA’s impact on the former spouse of a deceased plan
participant. For each side of the debate,12 it will first explore the stories
behind the decisions that established post-event assignment of
retirement benefits; then, it will discuss how later courts applied these
Theogonic cases to justify posthumous distributions. 13 This step-by-step
analysis reveals a conflict more titanic than initially imagined. Current
jurisprudence is like Typhoeus giving birth to a three-headed monster

CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/main/www/popclock.html (last visited Dec.
20, 2011) (providing the current population data for the United States and the world).
9
The term baby boomer refers to the generation born between 1946 and 1964. In 2006,
the oldest of the estimated 78.2 million baby boomers began turning sixty at a rate of
approximately 7,918 people per day. U.S. Census Bureau, Oldest Baby Boomers Turn 60!,
NEWSROOM: FACTS FOR FEATURES (Jan. 3, 2006), http://www.census.gov/newsroom/
releases/archives/facts_for_features_special_editions/cb06-ffse01-2.html.
This is a
significant age as an ERISA plan participant because this is when one might become
eligible for early retirement benefits, and it is a traditional retirement age for many
industrial occupations. See John W. Thompson, Defined Benefit Plans at the Dawn of ERISA,
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS (Mar. 30, 2005), http://www.bls.gov/opub/cwc/
cm20050325ar01p1.htm (noting that more than one-fourth of workers with early retirement
provisions had to wait until at least age sixty to obtain the early retirement benefits).
10
See EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INSTITUTE, FACTS FROM EBRI (2005), available at
http://www.ebri.org/pdf/publications/facts/0205fact.a.pdf (noting that there were
7,540,000 plan participants and total plan assets were approximately $91.75 billion in 1984).
By 2003, the number of participants had grown to 42.4 million people and plan assets had
jumped to $1.9 trillion. Id. During this time, the number of employers offering ERISA
retirement plans increased from 17,303 to 438,000. Id.
11
See infra Part I.B (providing the origins of ERISA and REA’s legislation).
12
Rather than broadly analyzing ERISA’s anti-alienation provisions, this Article
addresses anti-alienation within the context of posthumous distributions of pension plan
assets to QDRO beneficiaries. The central matter of contention is whether there is an
exemption from ERISA’s anti-alienation provisions that sufficiently permits courts to
distribute assets to a QDRO beneficiary on a retroactive basis if the plan participant dies
before the distribution.
13
“Theogony” is a poem by Hesiod describing the births and origins of the Greek gods.
The Theogony of Hesiod, SACRED-TEXTS.COM (Hugh G. Evelyn-White trans., 1914),
http://www.sacred-texts.com/cla/hesiod/theogony.htm.
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that may require a Herculean effort from Congress to resolve the issue. 14
Finally, this Article will offer suggestions to all relevant parties affected
by this dilemma—claimants, plan administrators, and state court
judges—regarding what steps one can take to mitigate the injustices that
will continue until Congress takes action.
B. The Origin Story: The Adoption and Evolution of ERISA
The pension plan—as we know it today—became popular just before
the turn of the twentieth century and remained relatively unchanged for
many decades.15 In the 1940s and 1950s, Congress tried regulating
pension plans or curbing the abuses growing within the system, but had
little success.16 However, between 1958 and 1974, three events served as
catalysts for Congress to make changes once again.17 The first evidence
of change occurred in 1962 when President John F. Kennedy created an
Executive Committee on Corporate Pension Funds and Other Private
Retirement and Welfare Programs (“Committee”).18 After a four-year
study, the Committee concluded, “there were no effective government
standards governing welfare and pension plans.”19 This led the
Committee to make several recommendations for sweeping reform.20

14
Typhoeus was a terrifying monster that challenged Zeus for supremacy among the
gods. NEW LAROUSSE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MYTHOLOGY 93, 165 (Richard Aldington & Delano
Ames trans., Felix Guirand ed., Prometheus Press 9th ed. 1974) (1959). He is the father of
many famous Greek monsters, including Cerberus, the three-headed dog that guarded the
entrance to Hades. Id. Hercules was the son of Zeus and Alcmene. PHILIP MATYSZAK, THE
GREEK AND ROMAN MYTHS: A GUIDE TO THE CLASSICAL STORIES 148–58 (2010). Hera
assigned Hercules to complete twelve tasks, the twelfth of which was to capture Cerberus.
Id. He accomplished this task without the aid of any weapons, and when completed,
Hercules returned Cerberus to his original place at the entrance to Hades. Id.
15
See ERISA: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE 1-3–1-4 (Paul J. Schneider & Brian M. Pinheiro
eds., 3d. ed. 2008) (“The American Express Company established one of the first recorded
private pension plans in 1875. By 1910, nearly 100 plans had been formed.”).
16
Id. at 1-5. Congress enacted the Labor Management Relations Act in 1947. Id. It
established criminal penalties for breaches of a trustee’s fiduciary duties, but was
ineffective, and plan abuse continued to grow. Id. In 1958, Congress enacted the Welfare
and Pension Plan Disclosures Act; however, the original plan lacked enforcement powers,
which Congress did not add until 1962. Id. at 1-6.
17
See id. at 1-6–1-7 (presenting three events that sparked Congress to make changes to
regulate the abuse within the pension plan system).
18
Id. at 1-6.
19
Id.
20
See id. (“The Committee recommended the imposition of mandatory minimum
vesting and funding standards, the creation of voluntary portability and plan termination
insurance systems, the imposition of limitations on pension fund investment in employer
securities, and amendments to the Internal Revenue Code’s ‘qualified status’
requirements.”).
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The Committee’s suggested reforms gained public support from the
1963 termination of the Studebaker-Packard Corporation’s pension plan,
which resulted in nearly 4,400 former employees losing either all or some
of their pension benefits.21 As a direct result of this event, the United
Auto Workers Union collaborated with Senator Vance Harke of Indiana
to draft the Federal Reinsurance of Private Pensions Act (“FRPPA”).22
Congress, however, did not adopt the FRPPA, and efforts to reform the
pension system stalled.23 The 1969 assassination of Joseph Yablonski, Sr.
was the straw that broke the camel’s back and thus, the tragic inspiration
for change.24 This horrific act demonstrated the true extent of pension
plan corruption and abuse, and it served as an opportunity for New
York Senator Jacob Javits to push forward with the pension reform
system that remains in effect today.25
1.

Out of the Chaos a New Pantheon of Government Regulation
Emerges: The Adoption of ERISA

Investigation and testimony during Senate subcommittee meetings
regarding Senator Javits’ proposal revealed a pension system plagued
with “harsh vesting provisions, lax funding requirements, and the
complete lack of portability and insurance programs.”26 Congress
enacted ERISA in response to the chaos that was uncovered by these
subcommittee meetings.27 Unlike previous attempts to reform the
pension system,28 ERISA had several provisions that gave it the
authority, the strength, and the tools to ensure reform of the pension
21
James A. Wooten, “The Most Glorious Story of Failure in the Business”: The StudebakerPackard Corporation and the Origins of ERISA, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 683, 728–32 (2001).
22
Id. at 735.
23
See id. (noting that the Harke proposal raised the issues surrounding termination
insurance programs, but solved few).
24
ERISA, supra note 15, at 1-6. Yablonksi was murdered shortly after he lost the election
for union president of the United Mine Workers of America to Tony Boyle. Id. at 1-7.
Public outcry over the murder sparked a Senate Labor Subcommittee investigation, which
led to charges of Boyle’s misuse of pension funds. Id.
25
Id. at 1-7.
26
Id. (footnotes omitted).
27
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 (2006)); Vicki Lawrence MacDougall, The
“Shared Risk” of Potential Tort Liability of Health Maintenance Organizations and the Defense of
ERISA Preemption, 32 VAL. U. L. REV. 855, 898 (1998) (explaining that Congress intended “to
‘protect employees from administrative and funding abuses’ in employee pension plans
and to establish ‘fair vesting requirements for pensions’” (quoting Larry J. Pittman, ERISA’s
Preemption Clause and the Health Care Industry: An Abdication of Judicial Law-Creating
Authority, 46 FLA. L. REV. 355, 358 (1994).
28
See ERISA, supra note 15, at 1-6–1-7 (discussing Congress’ previous attempts to reform
the pension system).
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system.29 The two provisions at the heart of this Article are the
preemption provision and the anti-alienation provision.30 Together,
these provisions consolidate power in plan administrators and have
tormented judges seeking to reconcile the application of ERISA with
domestic relations law, which is traditionally within the realm of the
state court system.31
a.

How ERISA Casts Its Shadow upon the World: Preemption

Akin to Poseidon’s trident,32 ERISA has a three-part preemption
scheme that can wreak havoc on those who interfere with ERISA’s
power or authority; this has been the source of confusion for courts since
ERISA’s creation.33 Within the context of this Article, the debate
surrounding the outer limits of ERISA’s preemption scheme fuels the
question whether a court may posthumously assign retirement plan
assets to an alternate payee. The statutory language states ERISA “shall
supersede any and all [s]tate laws insofar as they may now or hereafter
relate to any employee benefit plan.”34 In Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,35
the U.S. Supreme Court held that courts should interpret the language of
this provision with the normal meaning of the words.36

Id. at 1-8.
See 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (2006) (providing ERISA’s anti-alienation provision); 29
U.S.C. § 1144(a) (providing ERISA’s preemption provision).
31
See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Wheaton, 42 F.3d 1080, 1086–87 (7th Cir. 1994) (Manion, J.,
concurring) (arguing that the case should be dismissed because federal courts have
declined to assert jurisdiction over divorce cases that do not present a federal question); see
also DAVID CLAYTON CARRAD, THE COMPLETE QDRO HANDBOOK 3 (3d ed. 2009) (“The
potential for conflict between ERISA’s anti-assignment clause and the developing state
domestic relations law doctrine of pension divisibility rapidly turned into a very serious
problem.”); MacDougall, supra note 27, at 898 (noting that ERISA’s preemption clause “is
‘one of the most heavily litigated topics in the law of plans’”).
32
See FRÉDÉRIQUE VIVIER, GREEK MYTHOLOGY 60 (Derek Johnston trans., 2005) (noting
that Poseidon was the brother of Zeus and ruler of the seas, and he was known to carry a
trident that caused earthquakes when he struck it against anything).
33
See ERISA, supra note 15, at 9-4 (describing the three parts as: (1) the scope of
preemption; (2) the savings clause; and (3) the deemer clause).
34
29 U.S.C. § 1144(a); see also Michael Serota & Michelle Singer, Comment, Maintaining
Healthy Laboratories of Experimentation: Federalism, Health Care Reform, and ERISA, 99 CAL. L.
REV. 557, 580 (2011) (“ERISA contains one of the most sweeping preemption provisions
ever enacted by Congress, which has been interpreted by the Supreme Court to supplant
nearly all state regulation of welfare benefit plans.”); MacDougall, supra note 27, at 898
(“This preemption clause is ‘the most expansive preemption prevision contained in federal
law’ . . . .” (quoting JAY CONISON, EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLANS IN A NUTSHELL 314 (1993)).
35
463 U.S. 85 (1983).
36
See id. at 96–97 (citing to the dictionary to hold that the phrase “relate to” should be
given its normal meaning (internal quotation marks omitted)).
29
30
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This normal meaning test casted a broad net and forced many courts
to apply ERISA to circumstances having little, if any, impact on
employee benefit plans.37 For example, state court judges had to
determine whether the phrase with respect to extended to domestic
relations issues, such as divorce.38 If a judge determined that a spouse’s
ERISA-covered pension plan was a marital asset, then the judge would
also have to determine whether the assets related to the ERISA plan
under Shaw.39 This additional step would have been necessary because
following the provisions of ERISA would render the state court
powerless to include those assets in a divorce settlement since ERISA
also contained an anti-alienation provision.40
b.

How ERISA Maintains Its Power over the Purse: Anti-Alienation

Section 1056 of ERISA states: “Each pension plan shall provide that
benefits provided under the plan may not be assigned or alienated.”41
This provision prevents a plan participant or a plan administrator from
separating out and segregating assets within an ERISA-sponsored plan
from itself. The purpose of this restriction is to protect a participant from
financial improvidence and to help ensure the assets will actually be
available for retirement purposes.42 However, the State of California
began determining that pension benefits earned during the course of a
marriage were marital assets and were divisible in divorce proceedings.43
The reason anti-alienation is particularly troublesome in divorce
proceedings is due to ERISA’s failure to articulate what interest a spouse

ERISA, supra note 15, at 9-7.
See Trs. of the Dirs. Guild of Am.-Producer Pension Benefits Plans v. Tise, 234 F.3d
415, 423 (9th Cir. 2000) (presenting the court’s discussion of the phrase with respect to in a
case involving the issue of whether a state court order is also effective as a QDRO under
ERISA); see also infra notes 117–20 and accompanying text (noting the court’s interpretation
of the statutory language and analysis in Tise).
39
See, e.g., Hogan v. Raytheon Co., 302 F.3d 854, 855 (8th Cir. 2002) (demonstrating that
the court determined what assets related to the ERISA-governed pension plan). However,
state courts that found ERISA did not preempt state divorce proceedings do not account for
Congress’ clear contemplation of the scope of ERISA’s preemption and its relationship to
state laws. See 29 U.S.C § 1144(b)(2)(A) (2006) (noting that the only state laws that are
exempt are those that regulate insurance, banking, or securities).
40
29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (2006).
41
Id.
42
Hawkins v. Comm’r, 86 F.3d 982, 988 (10th Cir. 1996).
43
See Carpenters Pension Trust v. Kronschnabel, 460 F. Supp. 978, 983 (C.D. Cal. 1978)
(“This established state policy of including pension benefits in the pool of community
property generated by husband and wife during marriage should not be emasculated
cavalierly by the court where neither the language of the federal statute, nor the underlying
policies of preemption require it.”).
37
38
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would have in the participant’s pension benefits.44 According to one
circuit court judge, this omission “left women who worked in the home
and contributed significantly to the family’s financial security without
the ability to obtain any pension benefits upon their husbands’ death or
upon divorce.”45 ERISA’s preemption of state laws is necessary to
further its goal of creating standard procedures applicable to all benefit
plans.46 However, the lack of guidance concerning the application of the
anti-alienation provision to domestic relations law seemed at odds with
another policy carried out by ERISA, which is to protect the financial
well-being of employees and their families.47 This lack of guidance
ultimately led Congress to substantially revise ERISA.
C. If ERISA Were Zeus, His Favorite Son Hercules Has Arrived: The Passage
of the REA and the Birth of the Qualified Domestic Relations Order
Between 1974 and 1984, Congress provided no indication that state
courts should do anything other than follow the broad preemptive
language of ERISA, yet many courts were reluctant to conclude that the
legislation reached into the domestic relations arena.48 In 1984, Congress
responded to this confusion by passing the REA, which created “an
exception not only to ERISA’s rule against assignment of plan benefits
but also to ERISA’s broad preemption of state law.”49 Congress created a
qualified domestic relations order (“QDRO”) as the mechanism to allow
an alternate payee to segregate funds from the participant’s pension
plan.50 A QDRO “creates or recognizes the existence of an alternate
payee’s right to, or assigns to an alternate payee the right to, receive all
Ablamis v. Roper, 937 F.2d 1450, 1453 (9th Cir. 1991).
Id.
46
ERISA, supra note 15, at 9-3.
47
Id. at 1-8–1-9.
48
See Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581 (1979) (“State family and familyproperty law must do ‘major damage’ to ‘clear and substantial’ federal interests before the
Supremacy Clause will demand that state law be overridden.”); Trs. of the Dirs. Guild of
Am.-Producer Pension Benefit Plans v. Tise, 234 F.3d 415, 419 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he courts
of appeals disagreed about whether state court orders issued pursuant to domestic
relations proceedings could affect the distribution of pension benefits governed by
ERISA.”); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Wheaton, 42 F.3d 1080, 1082 (7th Cir. 1994) (“Before [the
REA] was passed, [courts] had held that ERISA did not preempt state domestic relations
law.”).
49
Tise, 234 F.3d at 420; see also Wheaton, 42 F.3d at 1084 (noting that the REA provides
“an exception to preemption for [QDROs] pertaining to all ERISA plans, not just pension
plans”); Ablamis, 937 F.2d at 1454 (highlighting that Congress made an important exception
for victims of divorce or separation). “To protect their interests, the REA creates an express
statutory exception to the prohibition on assignment and alienation in the case of
distributions made pursuant to certain state court orders.” Id.
50
29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(A) (2006).
44
45
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or a portion of the benefits payable with respect to a participant under a
plan.”51
To qualify as a QDRO, a state domestic relations order (“DRO”)
must meet three rather complex, but clearly defined, sets of
qualifications.52 First, the DRO must be a “judgment, decree, or
order . . . which . . . relates to the provision of child support, alimony
payments, or marital property rights to a spouse, former spouse, child,
or other dependant of a participant, and . . . is made pursuant to a [s]tate
domestic relations law . . . .”53 Second, the DRO must clearly specify:
(i) the name and the last known mailing address (if any)
of the participant and the name and mailing address of
each alternate payee covered by the order,
(ii) the amount or percentage of the participant’s benefits
to be paid by the plan to each such alternate payee, or
the manner in which such amount or percentage is to be
determined,
(iii) the number of payments or period to which such
order applies, and
(iv) each plan to which such order applies.54
Third, the DRO must not require the plan to do any of the following: (1)
it cannot “require a plan to provide any type or form of benefit, or any
option, not otherwise provided under the plan”; (2) it cannot “require
the plan to provide increased benefits (determined on the basis of
actuarial value)”; and (3) it cannot “require the payment of benefits to an
alternate payee which are required to be paid to another alternate payee
under another order previously determined to be a qualified [DRO].”55
Once the plan administrator has received the DRO, it must segregate
the funds in question.56 Then, the administrator has eighteen months to
determine whether the DRO meets the requirements to become a
QDRO.57 If so, the plan administrator must pay the segregated amount
to the alternate payee; however, if the plan administrator fails to make

Id. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(i)(I).
Id. § 1056(d)(3)(C)–(D).
53
Id. § 1056 (d)(3)(B)(ii)(I)–(II); see also Tise, 234 F.3d at 420 n.3 (noting that Suzanne Tise
was an appropriate alternate payee because the award was for child support payments and
she was the children’s mother).
54
29 U.S.C. § 1056 (d)(3)(C)(i)–(iv).
55
Id. § 1056(d)(3)(D)(i)–(iii).
56
Id. § 1056(d)(3)(H)(i)–(ii).
57
Id.
51
52

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2012

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 46, No. 2 [2012], Art. 7

538

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

this determination within eighteen months, the plan administrator must
pay the funds to whoever would receive them, absent the DRO.58
Although Congress set forth a detailed list of qualifications that a
DRO must meet for the plan administrator to consider it a QDRO,
Congress failed to clarify one critical factor: When does the state
“judgment, decree, or order” create the alternate payee’s rights of
assignment? 59 More specifically, are the alternate payee’s rights created
when a court issues a judgment, divorce decree, written order, or when
the plan administrator accepts the judgment, divorce decree, or written
order? Moreover, if based on the plan administrator’s acceptance, is it
based on acceptance of a DRO or based on certification of a QDRO?
Perhaps Congress was trying to avoid Pandora’s mistake and leave the
box closed.60
II. DRINKING A CUP OF AMBROSIA: IN SOME COURTS A QDRO IS IMMORTAL
The first line of cases this Article explores, highlighting the deference
the U.S. Supreme Court shows to state domestic relations law,61 will
illustrate how some state courts are able to change DROs after the
participant’s death. This school of thought is founded on the belief that
the DRO—created under state law—is actually the instrument that
creates the ex-spouse’s interest in the marital property, rather than the
qualification of the DRO by the plan administrator, which creates the
QDRO.62

58
Id. § 1056(d)(3)(H)(ii)–(v); see also Tise, 234 F.3d at 422 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(H));
ERISA, supra note 15, at 3-68 (“If, within such 18-month period, the order is determined not
to be a QDRO or the qualified status of the order has not been resolved, the plan
administrator must pay the segregated amounts (plus earnings) to the person who would
have been entitled to such amounts if there had been no order.”).
59
29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(ii).
60
Zeus commanded the creation of a woman made from clay. MATYSZAK, supra note 14,
at 29. She was named Pandora and received gifts from the other gods. Id. These gifts were
stored in an urn (Pandora’s box), which Pandora was instructed not to open. Id. However,
Pandora’s curiosity led her to open the box and release its contents. Id. Thus, Greek
mythology credits Pandora with unleashing evil, disease, and violence into the world. Id.
61
Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581 (1979).
62
See 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(G) (establishing that the plan administrator creates the
QDRO and requiring that the plan establish procedures to determine the qualified status of
a DRO).
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A. The Divorce Decree is the Muse that Will Bring Eternal Life for the QDRO
An early example of the DRO’s potential for immortality is In re
Gendreau,63 in which the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
refused to allow William Gendreau’s bankruptcy to cut off his ex-wife’s
interest in his pension plans.64 William and Colleen Gendreau were
divorced in 1992, and Colleen received a judgment from the state court
of a fifty percent interest in William’s pension plans for the time they
were married.65 In January 1993, Colleen sought a QDRO to obtain her
interest in the pension plans.66 However, in May 1993, the plan
administrator refused to qualify Colleen’s DRO and refused to distribute
the funds because her DRO failed to comply with QDRO requirements.67
Before she obtained a qualified order, William filed for bankruptcy and
sought to have Colleen’s interest in his pension plan discharged as part
of his bankruptcy petition.68
The basis for William’s claim was that ERISA’s anti-alienation
provision precludes a claimant’s property interest from arising until the
claimant obtains the QDRO. 69 William argued that absent a QDRO,
there is merely “a right to obtain a QDRO and payment.”70 However,
the Ninth Circuit rejected William’s argument and held it was the
divorce decree, written pursuant to state law, which established
Colleen’s interest in the pension proceeds.71
The court found several provisions within ERISA and the REA
justifying this conclusion, provisions later courts used to rationalize
posthumous amendments to a DRO, just as the Ninth Circuit allowed a
post-bankruptcy amendment to Colleen’s QDRO.72 First, the court
63
122 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 1997). This case addresses the parallel issue of a spouse who is
seeking to enforce her divorce decree against her ex-husband who filed for bankruptcy
between the period when Mrs. Gendreau obtained her divorce decree and obtained a
QDRO. Id. at 817. The holding of this case is significant, as courts later apply its rational to
the context of a participant’s death. See Tise, 234 F.3d at 423 (“As the circumstances of this
case illustrate, unless the QDRO could issue after the plan participant’s death, Congress’
intent to protect the interests of plan participants’ former dependents could be thwarted.”).
64
Gendreau, 122 F.3d at 819.
65
Id. at 817.
66
Id.
67
Id.; see also 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B) (listing the QDRO requirements).
68
Gendreau, 122 F.3d at 817.
69
See supra notes 42–48 and accompanying text (discussing ERISA’s anti-alienation
provision).
70
Gendreau, 122 F.3d at 818.
71
Id. But see Samaroo v. Samaroo, 193 F.3d 185, 190 (3d. Cir. 1999) (“Under ERISA, the
rights could only be conveyed by a QDRO.”).
72
See Trs. of the Dirs. Guild of Am.-Producer Pension Benefits Plans v. Tise, 234 F.3d
415, 421 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting that the court was expanding upon its own conclusion—the
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determined that subsequent to the divorce decree, Colleen’s claim
becomes one against the plan administrator, rather than one against her
ex-husband.73 This means that William’s discharge of his debt doesn’t
impact Colleen’s interest. Second, ERISA requires the plan administrator
to segregate the funds that will become payable to the alternate payee
through the QDRO based merely on notice of the pending claim.74 Third,
the court determined any other conclusion would defeat the policies
ERISA sought to protect.75
While the court seemingly arrived at the correct conclusion, it
muddied one policy interpretation it used to justify its later conclusions.
Specifically, the court determined that a QDRO is not a declaration of
one’s interest in the assets, but merely a restriction on enforcement of
that interest.76 However, this seems to make the existence of a QDRO
superfluous because ERISA, as originally written, was sufficient to
prevent enforcement of an alternate property interest.
B. Like Hermes Guides the Souls of the Dead, a Vested Property Interest
Guides the QDRO to Immortality
Despite its potentially flawed interpretation of the purpose behind a
QDRO, just three years later, the Ninth Circuit applied the principles it
articulated in Gendreau to a circumstance in which a participant died
before the claimant obtained a QDRO.77 In Trustees of the Directors Guild
of America-Producer Pension Benefits v. Tise, Charles Myers and Suzanne
Tise, although not married, had two children together.78 In 1981, after
their relationship ended, Tise obtained a default paternity and child
support judgment against Myers, which he never voluntarily paid.79 In
1991, Tise obtained a state court order barring distributions from Myers’
pension plans unless the Directors Guild of American-Producer Pension
Benefits Plan (“the Plan”) notified Tise before the distribution.80

divorce decree creates the participant’s interest in the plan and the QDRO is merely a
restriction on enforcement of that judgment).
73
See Gendreau, 122 F.3d at 818 (finding the shift in liability to Colleen is evident because
she has legal recourse to sue the plan, rather than William, for failure to pay the claim).
74
Id.
75
See id. at 819 (“[T]he purpose of the QDRO exception was to protect the financial
security of divorcees. This protection would be meaningless if [an ex-husband] could
thwart his spouse’s interest by filing bankruptcy before she obtained a QDRO . . . .”).
76
Id.
77
Tise, 234 F.3d at 417–18.
78
Id. at 417.
79
Id.
80
Id.
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Although the order did not specifically name a pension plan, Tise
notified and provided a copy of the order to the Plan.81
Later, the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) served a competing levy
on the Plan for Myers’ failure to pay taxes; the Plan notified Tise and
inquired into her intent to obtain a QDRO.82 In response, Tise
immediately obtained a writ of execution against the Plan and ultimately
moved the court for an order declaring that she was entitled to a
QDRO.83 It was not until April 1996 that Tise was able to obtain the
QDRO order.84
The delay arose because Myers died in February 1995, and two
months prior, he named Yvonne Curry as the sole beneficiary of his
pension plan benefits.85 Upon Myers’ death, Tise, Curry, and the IRS
submitted three competing claims against the Plan.86 In response, the
Plan and the various parties contested the conflicting claims.87 However,
the district court resolved the competing claims in favor of Tise once she
obtained her DRO from the state court.88 The foundation for the state
court’s DRO in 1996 was its asserted jurisdiction over Myers’ pension
plan via its 1991 order, which created the right for Tise to collect
proceeds from the plan based on the 1981 judgment for child support.89
To accomplish this, the court issued a nunc pro tunc (now for then) order
that amended the 1991 order to conform to the provisions necessary to
create a QDRO for Tise.90 Both Curry and the Plan appealed the district
court’s decision.91

Id. at 417–18.
Id. at 418.
83
Id.
84
Id. at 419.
85
Id. at 418.
86
Id.
87
Id. at 418–19. The Plan sought a declaratory judgment to determine how much it was
obligated to pay to each party, and it obtained a stay of Tise’s proceedings to obtain a
QDRO. Id. at 418. In response, Curry, Tise, and the IRS sought interpleader actions, which
Tise sought to stay until she was able to obtain a QDRO. Id. Both the Plan and Curry
contested Tise’s motion to stay the proceedings. Id.
88
See id. at 419 (splitting the proceeds: $136,703.50 to the IRS; $226,071 to Tise; and
$3,000 to the Plan for attorneys’ fees).
89
Id. at 418–19. The Marin County Superior Court issued this QDRO on April 19, 1996,
which was fourteen months after Myers’ death on February 12, 1995. Id. at 419.
90
Id.
91
Id. One week before oral arguments began, the IRS unexpectedly withdrew from the
case. Id. The appellate court retained jurisdiction but remanded to the district court to
redistribute the funds. Id. The district court awarded Tise an additional $97,367 in
attorneys’ fees to fully satisfy the 1996 state court order. Id. The Plan and Curry
maintained their appeals after the redistribution. Id.
81
82
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Curry asserted three independent lines of reasoning supporting her
claim that she, not Tise, was entitled to the proceeds from Myers’
pension plan.
Curry first argued that Tise’s 1996 QDRO was
unenforceable because Curry’s interest in the plan proceeds vested in
1995, immediately upon Myers’s death.92 Second, Curry claimed that
immediately upon Myers’ death there was no longer a benefit payable
with respect to the participant (Myers), so the benefit could only be
payable to the listed beneficiary (Curry).93 Finally, Curry claimed she
“cannot be bound by the domestic relations orders issued in the TiseMyers child support proceedings.”94
Curry’s vesting argument was based on the premise that a QDRO is
required before a participant’s death for the proceeds to be assignable to
an alternate payee.95 Rejecting this contention, the court used its holding
in Gendreau to breathe life into Tise’s QDRO after Myers’ death.96 The
court determined:
The QDRO provision is an exception not only to ERISA’s
rule against assignment of plan benefits but also to
ERISA’s broad preemption of state law. State family law
can, therefore, create enforceable interests in the
proceeds of an ERISA plan, so long as those interests are
articulated in accord with the QDRO provision’s
requirements.97
With this, the court crafted a scenario in which the state court order
creates the claim against the pension plan proceeds,98 and the plan
administrator enforces that claim.99 Although it relied on Gendreau, the

Id.
Id. at 423.
94
Id. at 424.
95
Id. at 421 n.5.
96
Id. at 421.
97
Id. at 420 (citation omitted); see also Carland v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 935 F.2d 1114, 1120
(10th Cir. 1991) (holding that a divorce decree is not preempted by ERISA).
98
Compare In re Gendreau, 122 F.3d 815, 817 (9th Cir. 1997) (involving a case where the
court order was a divorce decree), with Tise, 234 F.3d at 417 (presenting a case where the
state court order was a child support judgment).
99
Tise, 234 F.3d at 421 (“Under this scheme, then, whether an alternate payee has an
interest in a participant’s pension plan is a matter decided by a state court according to the
state’s domestic relations law. Whether a state court’s order meets the statutory
requirements to be a QDRO, and therefore is enforceable against the pension plan, is a
matter determined in the first instance by the pension plan administrator, and, if necessary,
by a court of competent jurisdiction.”).
92
93
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court correctly re-characterized a QDRO as a tool for enforcement, as
opposed to a mechanism to prevent enforcement.100
The court also found four statutory and structural aspects of ERISA
to support its holding that a QDRO is not required before the
participant’s death.101 First, the court recognized that ERISA does not
specify that a QDRO must be in hand before benefits are payable.102
Second, when a plan administrator receives a DRO, the administrator is
required to segregate the funds in question away from the remaining
proceeds in the participant’s pension, while the plan administrator
determines whether the DRO qualifies as a QDRO.103 According to the
court, “[t]his benefit-segregation requirement obviously assumes that
benefits may already be payable during the period the plan is
determining whether the DRO is a QDRO.”104
Third, ERISA provides an eighteen-month period for the plan to
determine whether the DRO qualifies as a QDRO.105 The court
concluded that Congress did not create this eighteen-month period for
the plan administrator to make its decision about the DRO.106 “Rather,
the evident purpose of the 18-month period was to provide a time in
which any defect in the original DRO could be cured.”107 Fourth, the
plan administrator will pass the proceeds to the participant’s beneficiary
only if the alternate payee is unable to perfect the DRO into a QDRO
within the eighteen-month period.108 According to the court, the
combined effort of these provisions “permits an alternate payee who has
obtained a state law DRO before the plan participant’s retirement, death,
or other benefit-triggering event to perfect the DRO into a QDRO
thereafter.”109
Moreover, the court found strong policy arguments in favor of this
conclusion, finding that the alternate conclusion would necessarily make
the determination of the alternate payee’s rights subject to events that
were beyond the alternate payee’s control.110 Likewise, any other
Gendreau, 122 F.3d at 819.
Tise, 234 F.3d at 421–22.
102
See id. at 421 (“ERISA nowhere specifies that a QDRO must be in hand before benefits
become payable.”).
103
29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(H)(i) (2006); see also Tise, 234 F.3d at 421 (citing and discussing
29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(H)).
104
Tise, 234 F.3d at 422.
105
29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(H)(ii).
106
Tise, 234 F.3d at 422.
107
Id.
108
29 U.S.C § 1056(d)(3)(H)(iii); see also Tise, 234 F.3d at 422 (citing and discussing 29
U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(H)).
109
Tise, 234 F.3d at 422.
110
Id. at 423.
100
101
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conclusion “could encourage opponents of the putative alternate payee
to delay or complicate issuance or approval of a QDRO in the hope that
the benefit-triggering event would occur in the meantime.”111 The court
concluded that either of these reasons would frustrate Congress’s intent,
when it passed REA, to protect the financial interests of the plan
participants’ former dependents.112
Curry’s with-respect-to argument was based on the ERISA language
that grants the right to assign proceeds only those benefits that are
“payable with respect to a participant under a plan” to an alternate
payee.113 She contended that upon Myers’ death, the proceeds were no
longer payable with respect to him, but rather payable to her as the
beneficiary, thus removing the proceeds from the scope of Tise’s
The court quickly dismissed this argument as being
QDRO.114
inconsistent with both the statutory language and entire statutory
scheme of ERISA and the REA.115
The court engaged in some brief statutory interpretation to make a
distinction between benefits with respect to a participant and benefits
payable to a beneficiary.116 Specifically, the court illustrated that a
beneficiary is within the statutory definition of a participant according to
ERISA.117 Drawing upon the statutory language, the court interpreted
the meaning of “with respect to” as being analogous to “on account
of,”118 which led the court to the conclusion that “[t]hose benefits remain
payable ‘with respect to’ Myers even after his death because they
accrued for his benefit and that of his beneficiaries.”119
Curry’s scope argument was premised on the idea that even if the
child support order created Tise’s right to the proceeds, Curry was not a
party to that proceeding and not bound to follow it.120 While the court
conceded that Curry was correct in this regard, the court further
admitted that it cannot afford Curry relief on this ground alone and that
she is the victim of a harsh result intended by Congress:

Id.
Id.
113
Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(i)(I)).
114
Tise, 234 F.3d at 423.
115
Id. at 423–24.
116
Id. at 424.
117
Id.; see also 29 U.S.C. § 1002(7) (2006) (“The term ‘participant’ means any employee or
former employee of an employer . . . who is or may become eligible to receive a benefit of
any type from an employee benefit plan . . . or whose beneficiaries may be eligible to
receive any such benefit.”).
118
Tise, 234 F.3d at 424 (internal quotation marks omitted).
119
Id.
120
Id.
111
112
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Through its QDRO provisions, ERISA elevates a plan
participant’s legal obligations, commonly to a former
spouse or children of a previous marriage, over the
participant’s express wishes to provide for other
individuals as designated beneficiaries. While this result
may seem harsh to the designated beneficiary, the fact is
that Congress intended this displacement of a plan
participant’s wishes in some circumstances, in an effort
to mitigate the impact of divorce upon children and
former spouses.121
Although its rationale was shaky at times, the court denied all three
of Curry’s arguments and ruled in Tise’s favor. Most importantly, the
court found that “[b]ecause Tise had placed the plan on notice of her
interest in Myers’ pension plan proceeds before his death, the fact that he
died before the QDRO issued is immaterial.”122 The court went further
to note that the plan had notice of the pending QDRO before Myers’
death, and Tise obtained her QDRO within the eighteen-month time
limit.123 Here, the court emphasized plan notice, a matter not previously
discussed and certainly not part of the court’s statutory or policy
interpretations of ERISA. The court’s decision to allow posthumous
QDROs did not resolve the matter, however.
C. Opening Pandora’s Box: What Evils are Unleashed when the Decision
Between Mortality and Immortality Rests in the Hands of the Plan
Administrator
Even though the Ninth Circuit may have correctly resolved the
matter regarding the ability to issue a posthumous QDRO, it created a
much bigger problem. The Tise court emphasized that the plan’s notice
of the pending QDRO played a role in its decision to award the proceeds
to Tise, although it offered no justification for this emphasis.124 Because
the court declined to assert whether it would reach the same conclusion
if the plan did not have prior notice, one could consider this observation
merely dicta.125 Moreover, the court’s analysis downplayed the need for
prior notice when it said “[t]his complex, carefully articulated statutory
Id. at 425.
Id. at 426.
123
Id.
124
See id. (“Because Tise had placed the plan on notice of her interest in Myers’ pension
plan proceeds before his death, the fact that he died before the QDRO issued is
immaterial.”).
125
See id. at 426 n.9 (declining to determine whether a QDRO can be issued if the plan is
not on notice before the participant’s death).
121
122
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scheme, then, plainly contemplates, and accounts in detail for, the
situation in which the event that triggers the payment of benefits occurs
before the plan knows whether it will be obliged to make payments to an
alternate payee.”126
Nevertheless, in 2002, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit relied on Tise and its notice requirement for its decision in Hogan
v. Raytheon Co.127 The Eighth Circuit determined that the DRO in
question met “the requirements of a QDRO because Raytheon was put on
notice that the [d]ecree had [sic] issued and may be a QDRO, and the
[order] was filed during the eighteen-month period permitted under
ERISA to secure a QDRO.”128 According to the Eighth Circuit, prior
notice rendered the participant’s death irrelevant.129 Thus, we can see
how Tise lifted the lid on Pandora’s box by giving credence to the plan
administrator’s notice prior to death.
The following year, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
examined whether a claimant could obtain a QDRO after the death of a
participant when the plan had not received notice of the DRO before the
participant’s death.130 Just as Bellerophon was the first to capture and
ride Pegasus,131 the Tenth Circuit was the first court to examine and
reject the notice requirement. In Patton v. Denver Post Corp., the court
focused on interpreting the plan provisions, rather than conducting a
statutory interpretation of ERISA, because it found that:
Neither side, either in the briefs or at oral argument,
provided any specific citation to support its assertion.
Nor have we been able to discover any part of the
statute itself or any interpretation of the statute in case
law or secondary scholarly materials demonstrating to
us that the statute requires such notice to be given.132
In this instance, the court determined that the plan permitted
posthumous changes without notice before the participant’s death
126
Id. at 422. The court emphasized that the triggering event occurs before the plan
administrator is on notice. Id.
127
302 F.3d 854, 857 (8th Cir. 2002).
128
Id. (emphasis added). The court held that the lower court was correct to award
benefits to the former spouse. Id.
129
Id.
130
See supra notes 108–09 and accompanying text (noting that ERISA’s provisions require
an alternate payee to receive notice of the DRO before the participant’s death).
131
See MATYSZAK, supra note 14, at 134 (noting that during his mission to kill Chimera,
Athena gave Bellerophon a magical harness to tame and ride Pegasus, the winged horse
offspring of Medusa and Poseidon).
132
326 F.3d 1148, 1151 (10th Cir. 2003).
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because: (1) the plan did not specify that notice was required before
death; and (2) the plan had procedures in place for “post hoc
determinations of whether the domestic relations order [was]
qualified.”133 The court gave more weight to the latter for its basis in the
language of the statute, despite not undertaking a statutory
interpretation of ERISA.134
Patton’s significance expanded beyond the Tenth Circuit because it
expressly relied on the notice issue that originated in Hogan. Specifically,
the Tenth Circuit stated: “While Hogan noted that the plan had notice a
QDRO might issue, such notice was not essential to its determination of
the order’s validity.”135 Thus, Tise has created a disfigured body of law
that, like the Minotaur, is seemingly the product of two different
species.136 All three jurisdictions permit posthumous QDROs: The
Eighth and Ninth Circuits require the plan have notice before the
participant’s death, but the Tenth Circuit does not.137
The Tenth Circuit relied on the power of a nunc pro tunc order as a
legitimate and binding tool to adjudicate domestic relations law. One
wonders whether Patton would permit the use of a nunc pro tunc order
after the eighteen-month statute of limitations. In its analysis of Hogan,
the court mentioned that the timing of Mr. Hogan’s death was
irrelevant,138 but it failed to specify the scope of nunc pro tunc power
within the scope of the statutory period. A more recent case sheds little
explicit clarity on this issue, but it resolves the matter similarly to the
Tenth Circuit.
In R.A.F. ex rel. Woodall v. Southern Co. Pension Plan,139 the U.S.
District Court for the Middle District of Alabama analyzed the
legitimacy of a posthumous QDRO in a manner similar to Patton.
Similar to the Patton court, the Middle District of Alabama looked to the
133
Id. The court found that notice of a beneficiary is not required before death; therefore,
notice of a DRO should not be required either. Id.
134
See id. at 1151 n.1 (noting that for eighteen months from the date the first payment
would have been made, the decision about the QDRO is retroactive); see also 29 U.S.C.
§ 1056(d)(3)(H)(v) (2006) (providing the text of the statute and specifically noting that the
eighteen-month period begins “with the date on which the first payment would be
required to be made under the [DRO]”).
135
Patton, 326 F.3d at 1153.
136
See VIVIER, supra note 32, at 96 (noting that one of the most famous monsters in Greek
mythology, the Minotaur, had the head of a bull and the body of a human).
137
Compare Hogan v. Raytheon, Co., 302 F.3d 854, 857 (8th Cir. 2002) (requiring that the
plan have notice before the participant’s death), and Trs. of the Dirs. Guild of Am.-Producer
Pension Benefits Plans v. Tise, 234 F.3d 415, 426 (9th Cir. 2000) (requiring that the plan have
notice before the participant’s death), with Patton, 326 F.3d at 1153 (noting that the
participant’s death before the notice was irrelevant).
138
Patton, 326 F.3d at 1153.
139
No. 2:07-cv-192-WKW, 2008 WL 2397391 (M.D. Ala. June 10, 2008).
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provisions of the plan itself to determine whether the plan should be
required to accept the QDRO without any notice.140 Regarding this
issue, the court held that the plan could be required to accept a
posthumous QDRO because “the Plan itself allows for benefits to be paid
in certain cases when a QDRO is not received prior to the death of a
participant.”141
R.A.F. is more significant for its analysis than for its factual
determination,142 primarily because it is a second jurisdiction utilizing
the plan-provision analysis the Tenth Circuit created in Patton.143 In
addition, R.A.F. sheds a dim, but probably correct, light on the matter of
issuing a nunc pro tunc order after eighteen months.144 Here, the court
rejected the use of a nunc pro tunc order because two years had passed
since the participant’s death.145 In doing so, it also distinguished the use
of a nunc pro tunc in another case based on the length of time that had
passed after the participant’s death.146 Not all jurisdictions, however,
adhere to the view that plan administrators can change terms of the
QDRO after the participant’s death.
III. WHAT IF THERE WERE NO GOLDEN FLEECE: SOME COURTS DO NOT
PERMIT CHANGES TO A QDRO AFTER DEATH
Regardless of whether the plan permits filing a QDRO after the
participant’s death, with or without notice, there are some jurisdictions
in which the participant’s death terminates the alternate payee’s
opportunity to perfect the DRO into a QDRO. Like Tise and its progeny,
this faction of courts took an indirect path to arrive at its conclusion.147
The foundation-laying case for the denial of posthumous QDROs is
Id. at *10.
Id.
142
See id. at *10–11 (emphasizing that although the court found that the plan could be
liable to a QDRO received without notice after the participant’s death, it held, in this
instance, that the plaintiff’s divorce decree did not qualify as a QDRO because the alternate
payee submitted it two years after the participant’s death).
143
See id. at *10 (determining that the plan rules permitting a certain posthumous
situation was a factor in determining whether the QDRO should be accepted); see also
Patton, 326 F.3d at 1151 (interpreting the plan provisions to determine that the posthumous
QDRO would not create an additional burden on the plan). The court did not cite to any
authority when conducting this analysis, and further distinguished itself from the factual
circumstances of Patton. Woodall, 2008 WL 2397391, at *10.
144
Id.
145
Id.
146
Id. (citing Payne v. GM/UAW Pension Plan, No. CIV.A. 95-73554, 1996 WL 943424, at
*3 (E.D. Mich. May 7, 1996)).
147
See supra notes 61–62 and accompanying text (revisiting the differences in the circuits’
positions).
140
141
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Hopkins v. AT&T Global Information Solutions Co.148 In Hopkins, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied a plan participant’s
former spouse her ability to obtain a QDRO after the participant
separated from the plan because the benefits had already vested to his
current spouse.149
Paul and Vera Hopkins divorced in 1986 after twenty-six years of
marriage.150 At the divorce hearing, the court awarded Vera alimony
rather than a distribution from Paul’s pension, which the court declared
was a marital asset.151 To collect her alimony, Vera obtained a court
ordered garnishment of Paul’s wages that continued until his retirement
in 1993.152 Under the AT&T pension plan, Paul collected his retirement
income from a qualified joint and survivor annuity that also had a fifty
percent benefit to his surviving spouse, who was Sherry Hopkins at the
time of his retirement.153
In 1994, Vera obtained an order from the Wood County Circuit
Court naming herself, rather than Sherry, as the surviving spouse on
Paul’s qualified joint and survivor annuity.154 However, the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of West Virginia determined that the
court order naming Vera the surviving spouse of the qualified joint and
survivor annuity was not a valid QDRO, as the annuity did not convey
benefits that were “payable with respect to a participant,”155 because the
benefits had become payable with respect to the beneficiary immediately
upon Paul’s retirement.156 To settle this matter, the Fourth Circuit had to
determine when spousal benefits vest to the named beneficiary.157
The Fourth Circuit found three ERISA provisions demonstrating that
benefits vest to the plan participant’s current spouse at the date of
retirement. First, the plan pays benefits to the spouse who was married
to the participant on the date of the participant’s retirement, rather than
105 F.3d 153 (4th Cir. 1997).
Id. at 156.
150
Id. at 154.
151
Id.
152
Id.
153
Id. at 154–55.
154
Id. at 155. The original order named Vera the alternate payee for Mr. Hopkins’
pension benefits as well as the surviving spouse for the annuity. Id. The county court later
split the order into a pension order and a surviving spouse order. Id. AT&T only contested
the surviving spouse order. Id.
155
Id. at 156 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(i)(I) (2006)) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also supra Part I.C (discussing ERISA’s statutory language).
156
Hopkins, 105 F.3d at 156.
157
See id. (determining Hopkins is a beneficiary and the benefits are not “paid with
respect to [the] participant” (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(i)(1)). But see Trs. of the Drs.
Guild of Am.-Producer Pension Benefits Plans v. Tise, 234 F.3d 415, 423 n.7 (9th Cir. 2000)
(rejecting the finding in Hopkins as being too narrowly focused and not applicable).
148
149
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on the participant’s death—as ERISA had previously required.158
Second, under the REA, the plan participant only has a ninety-day
window before retirement to change the beneficiary, and he may only do
so upon approval of the current spouse.159 Third, the REA prohibits the
participant from changing beneficiaries after retirement.160 The court
further noted that its conclusion “not only is consistent with the overall
framework of ERISA, but also balances the competing interests of the
former and current spouses.”161
Three years later, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
expanded upon Hopkins, similar to Tise’s expansion of Gendreau,162 and
concluded that plan benefits vest to the beneficiary at the participant’s
death. In Samaroo v. Samaroo,163 the Third Circuit affirmed the decision of
the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey, which relied on the
Fourth Circuit’s decision in Hopkins to determine that “entitlement to a
survivor’s annuity in respect [to the participant] had to be determined as
of the day [the participant] died.”164
Winston Samaroo died in 1987 while still working at AT&T
Technologies.165 At his death, he had been divorced from Louise
Robichaud for slightly less than three years.166 The divorce decree
granted half of Samaroo’s pension payments to Robichaud upon
retirement, but did not discuss division of Samaroo’s survivor annuity.167
Despite this, after Samaroo’s death, Robichaud obtained a court order
retroactively amending her divorce decree and granting her a fifty
percent survivorship right to Samaroo’s annuity benefits.168

Hopkins, 105 F.3d at 156.
Id. at 156–57.
160
Id. at 157.
161
Id.
162
Tise, 234 F.3d at 421. In Gendreau, the court considered whether a plan participant
could limit his ex-wife’s interest in his pension benefits by filing for bankruptcy. In re
Gendreau, 122 F.3d 815, 817 (9th Cir. 1997). The court determined the ex-wife’s interest
was fixed at the time of the divorce decree. Id. at 819. Therefore, filing for bankruptcy
post-divorce but prior to the QDRO was immaterial. Id. In Tise, the court held that death
occurring post-divorce, but before the QDRO, was likewise immaterial. 234 F.3d at 426.
163
193 F.3d 185 (3d Cir. 1999).
164
Id. at 189.
165
Id. at 187.
166
Id.
167
Id. at 187–88. Both Robichaud and the attorney who prepared the original divorce
agreement testified that they never discussed the survivor annuity during the divorce
negotiations. Id. at 188.
168
See id. (noting that the lower court granted the nunc pro tunc order because the divorce
was amicable and further stated that whether there are any benefits payable is a question of
federal law).
158
159
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The Third Circuit rejected the amended divorce decree and denied
Robichaud any interest in Samaroo’s survivor annuity.169 Arriving at
this conclusion, the court combined the finding in Hopkins with the
Supreme Court of New Jersey’s decision in Ross v. Ross.170 Like Samaroo,
Ross denied a participant’s former spouse the ability to amend a divorce
decree after the participant’s death.171
The Samaroo court justified denying the state-issued nunc pro tunc
order by articulating the distinction between the state’s ability to affect
the legal relationship between Robichaud and Samaroo, and the state’s
inability to affect the participant’s pension plan, which is within the
scope of federal law.172 The Samaroo court also rejected Robichaud’s
claim that denying her amended decree would result in the plan
cheating Samaroo out of any benefits for participating in the plan.173
However, the court attempted to mitigate the broad effects of its decision
by limiting its holding to the particular facts of that case.174
Despite the steps taken by the court to minimize the scope of its
holding, Judge Mansmann wrote a dissenting opinion characterizing the
decision as a determination “that a state court’s power to enter or modify
a [QDRO] with respect to a participant’s interest in a pension plan ends
with the participant’s death.”175 He further stated, “this holding will
work an unwarranted interference with the states’ ability to administer
their domestic relations law.”176 Judge Mansmann’s concern was valid
because district courts without circuit court guidance have relied on
Samaroo to hold that “rights to survivor’s benefits are fixed as [of] the
participant’s death.”177
Id. at 191.
Id. at 190; see also Ross v. Ross, 705 A.2d 784, 794 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998)
(holding that a divorce decree cannot vest the plan’s rights to the alternate payee unless a
QDRO exists at the time of the divorce).
171
See Ross, 705 A.2d at 797 (holding that a QDRO could not be entered after the
participant’s death).
172
Samaroo, 193 F.3d at 191; see also 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2006) (establishing that the
provisions of this chapter supersede all state laws).
173
Samaroo, 193 F.3d at 190. Although not stated directly, this may have been the court’s
attempt to recognize the factual distinction of Samaroo from both Hopkins and Ross
regarding the lack of competing beneficial interests.
174
Id. at 190 n.3.
175
Id. at 191–92 (Mansmann, J., dissenting).
176
Id. at 192 (Mansmann, J., dissenting).
177
Stahl v. Exxon Corp., 212 F. Supp. 2d 657, 670 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (alteration in original);
see supra note 163 and accompanying text (noting that the court determined that the former
spouse’s interest was fixed at the time of the divorce decree). Courts relying on Samaroo are
failing to heed the court’s own limitation of the application. In Guzman, the court directly
applied Samaroo, and distinguished the circumstances from Tise, without even
acknowledging the Samaroo limitation. Guzman v. Commonwealth Edison Co., No. 99-C169
170
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The Third Circuit’s decision in Samaroo was an extension of logic
from Hopkins, similar to the extension the Ninth Circuit took in Tise by
applying Gendreau beyond a bankruptcy situation.178 However, Samaroo
and the subsequent cases that have applied its reasoning are a significant
departure from Tise and represent an overwhelmingly minority faction
concerning the question of whether a QDRO can be filed
posthumously.179
IV. WILL IT TAKE A HERCULEAN EFFORT TO DEFEAT THIS THREE-HEADED
BEAST?: A CONCLUSION
So, what will become of our middle-aged woman if her ex-husband
dies before his retirement assets are divided? According to current
jurisprudence, the answer depends on where her husband worked,
whether she notified her ex-husband’s employer before his death, and
the legal jurisdiction in which he died. In short, who knows? We do
know this: America is made up of an aging population of individuals
who have worked anywhere from seven to twelve jobs during their lives
and are at least forty percent likely to get divorced.180 These statistics
582, 2000 WL 1898846, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 28, 2000). Furthermore, cases such as Thuney are
applying Samaroo for the principal that posthumous application of QDROs creates actuarial
uncertainty from the plan. See Thuney v. Locals 302 & 612 of the Int’l Union of Operating
Eng’rs-Emp’rs Const. Indus. Ret. Plan, No. C05-1539RSL, 2007 WL 1655116, at *3–4 n.3
(W.D. Wash. June 4, 2007) (applying Samaroo and noting that altering the benefits after the
triggering event occurred “would wreak actuarial havoc on administration of the Plan”
(quoting Samaroo, 193 F.3d at 190) (internal quotation marks omitted)). However, this is a
minor point that Samaroo adopted from a footnote in Hopkins, and neither court devoted
any analysis to justify its conclusion that the actuarial uncertainties are too great for the
plan administrators to bear.
178
See Files v. ExxonMobil Pension Plan, 428 F.3d 478, 487 n.12 (3d Cir. 2005) (discussing
its reliance on the reasoning established in Hopkins).
179
See supra note 161 (reiterating that the REA prohibits a participant from changing
beneficiaries after retirement). Compare Samaroo, 193 F.3d at 190 (holding that an alternate
payee’s right to obtain a QDRO is fixed at the death of the plan participant), with Trs. of the
Dirs. Guild of Am.-Producer Pension Benefits v. Tise, 234 F.3d 415, 426 (9th Cir. 2000)
(holding that a state court, via a nunc pro tunc order, can issue a DRO that the plan
administrator can determine is a QDRO after the participant’s death). No other circuit
court has adopted Samaroo’s rationale. District courts, without any circuit court precedent,
are the only courts that have expressly adopted the rational of Samaroo. But see R.A.F. ex rel.
Woodall v. S. Co. Pension Plan, 2008 WL 2397391, at *6 (M.D. Ala. June 10, 2008)
(recognizing the absence of authority within the Eleventh Circuit, yet holding in line with
the majority that ERISA does not require a plan administration to receive the QDRO before
the participant’s death).
180
See Economic News Release: Employee Tenure Summary, BUREAU LABOR STATISTICS (Sept.
14, 2010), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/tenure.nr0.htm (providing that as of January
2008, the average employee tenure was 4.1 years); see also Gayle Fee, Laura Raposa &
Megan Johnson, Arnold’s Cheating to Blame?, BOS. HERALD, May 12, 2011, at 16 (providing
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reveal that a problem, which once affected only a small few, will increase
in frequency.
A. Don’t Be Charmed by the Courts’ Siren Song
A recent decision from the California Court of Appeals accurately
stated that there appear to be two lines of authority regarding whether an
alternate payee is required to obtain a QDRO before the participant’s
death.181 As this analysis reveals, the apparent two-line split of authority
is merely a distraction, like the enchanted songs of the Sirens distracting
Odysseus.182 The important question is not whether a plan can accept a
QDRO posthumously, but whether it is necessary for the plan to have
notice of the forthcoming QDRO before the participant’s death. This is
the issue that even posthumous-permitting jurisdictions cannot fully
agree upon, and this is why focusing merely on the first issue will leave a
beneficiary shipwrecked without the benefits he or she deserves.
While other courts have adopted Samaroo’s conclusion that a QDRO
should not be immortal, this is a minority position built on a foundation
of quicksand. First, following Samaroo is inconsistent with the Third
Circuit’s unwillingness to broadly examine the legal issues and instead
limit its holding to the facts before it.183 Moreover, not withstanding
Samaroo, the Third Circuit has seen fit to side with Tise and its progeny
on occasion.184 Second, the courts that have done so currently are at the
district level and have not received guidance from their respective circuit
courts. Thus, there is opportunity for their respective circuit courts to
overturn these minority opinions and further strengthen the
posthumous-permitting coalition. Furthermore, circuit courts resolving
this issue for the first time are likely to continue moving away from
Samaroo, at least in part, because there is statutory support for the idea of
a QDRO that survives death. Primarily, Congress permits time for an
alternate payee to perfect a QDRO,185 and there is no evidence Congress
that in general, divorce rates have improved in the last decade, but the likelihood of
divorce for individuals over fifty years old has increased dramatically).
181
In re Marriage of Padgett, 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d 475, 483 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009).
182
HOMER, supra note 1, at 35–50.
183
See Samaroo, 193 F.3d at 190 n.3 (“Our holding and opinion are limited to the
particular facts before us, and it is not necessary that we reach the broader issue expressed
in the dissent’s characterization of our holding.”).
184
See Files v. ExxonMobil Pension Plan, 428 F.3d 478, 487 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding QDROs
need not be in place before death so long as the QDRO is enforcing a separate interest in
the pension plan that existed before death). Although Files limits the applicability of
Samaroo, the court did not overrule it. Id. The court specified that there are factual
circumstances in which it would be controlling. Id.
185
29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(H)(iv)–(v) (2006); see also Trs. of the Dirs. Guild of Am.-Producer
Pension Benefits Plans v. Tise, 234 F.3d 415, 421 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he statute specifically
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intended the participant’s death to automatically cut off the eighteenmonth correction period.186
This is why the mortality/immortality debate is not nearly as
problematic as whether there are conditions on immortality, namely plan
notice. To date, courts tackling this issue have turned to the pages of the
particular retirement plan in question for the answer. These cowardly
acts would appall Apollo. Determining whether notice is required based
on the plan provisions takes authority away from both Congress and the
judicial system, placing it in the hands of plan administrators.187
However, as this Article points out, giving plan administrators this
immense power and placing them on Mount Olympus will lead to the
unpredictability, lack of uniformity, and abuse of funds that ERISA
sought to eliminate.188
Who then can fill the shoes of Odysseus and bring this Odyssey to an
end? Through the Tise court’s refusal to even address the question and
the Patton court’s determination of the issue—by looking to the plan
provisions—these courts have implicitly determined that the statutory
language of ERISA in its current form is insufficient.189 There is merit to
that conclusion given the specificity with which Congress has detailed
other ERISA provisions.190
If the statutory language is insufficient, then Congress should amend
ERISA and clarify whether the participant must put the plan
administrator on notice of the pending QDRO before the participant’s
provides for situations in which no valid QDRO issues until after benefits become
payable.”).
186
See R.A.F. ex rel. Woodall v. S. Co. Pension Plan, 2008 WL 2397391, at *10 (M.D. Ala.
June 10, 2008) (recognizing an alternate payee may perfect a QDRO within the eighteenmonth time period and failing to grant relief to the plaintiff because her QDRO was not
submitted within that time frame).
187
In the recent decision, Kennedy v. Plan Administrator for DuPont Savings and Investment
Plan, the Supreme Court of the United States characterized it as a “bright-line requirement
to follow plan documents in distributing benefits” when the court-determined plan
administrator documents trump even federal common law. 555 U.S. 285, 302 (2009).
188
In addition, it fails to satisfy the rationale the Court described in Kennedy, which was
to avoid forcing administrators “to examine a multitude of external documents that might
purport to affect the dispensation of benefits, and . . . draw[ing them] into litigation like
this over the meaning and enforceability of purported waivers.” Id. at 301 (citation
omitted) (quoting Estate of Altobelli v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 77 F.3d 78, 82–83 (4th Cir.
1996) (Wilkinson, C.J., dissenting)).
189
In Files v. ExxonMobil Pension Plan, the Third Circuit suggested that ERISA’s silence on
the subject of prior notice was sufficient indication that it is not required. 428 F.3d 478 (3d
Cir. 2005). However, in this particular case, the plan did have notice before death, and the
court refrained from determining whether that factor was relevant to the outcome of the
case. Id. at 491.
190
See supra Parts I.A–C (discussing and presenting the evolution of the statutory
provisions contained in ERISA).
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death. Correcting the problem uncovered and examined in the paper
doesn’t require a major statutory overhaul, nor will it undermine the
general principals of ERISA’s statutory scheme.191 However, it will
provide plan administrators with a more clearly defined set of
instructions from which to operate.
Congress should take this
opportunity to overrule Samarro and its progeny by confirming that an
alternate payee has eighteen months after the participant’s death to
perfect a DRO and convert it into a QDRO.
Congress enacted ERISA, at least partially, with the intent to unify
the rules under which retirement plans operate.192 So long as this debate
is unresolved, Congress’ intent goes unfulfilled.
However, until
Congress takes action, there are steps each of the relevant parties can
take to mitigate the losses that may arise due to the uncertainties
surrounding this issue.
B. Follow These Directions to Avoid Being Blown Off Course
Alternate payees should make it a priority to put the plan
administration on notice as soon as possible after receiving a state court
order—the DRO. The alternate payee should do this regardless of
whether the DRO complies with the technical and substantive
requirements of a QDRO. This will help ensure that the alternate payee
will avoid having a claim fail if the plan provisions, or the court of
proper jurisdiction, require notice before the participant’s death to accept
a posthumous QDRO.
State court judges can ease the burden of this problem by becoming
familiar with the requirements for a DRO to qualify as a QDRO.193
191
See Kennedy, 555 U.S. at 301 (“ERISA’s statutory scheme ‘is built around reliance on
the face of written plan documents.’” (quoting Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 514
U.S. 73, 83 (1995))).
192
Heideman v. Gen. Motors Hourly-Rate Emps. Pension Plan, No 00-CV-0416A(SR),
2004 WL 1498198, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2004) (describing ERISA as a federal scheme
designed for the protection of pension plan participants and their employees with the
intent to ensure the employees’ benefits will be available upon retirement); see also Brian A.
Perez-Daple, Comment, Legal Reimbursement Claims by ERISA Plan Fiduciaries, 72 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1103, 1106 (2005) (noting that Congress sought to protect retirees’ pensions “through a
uniform federal administrative scheme”); Nancy L. Pirkey, Note, The Availability of Jury
Trials in ERISA Section 510 Actions: Expanding the Scope of the Seventh Amendment, 27 VAL. U.
L. REV. 139, 139 (1992) (“ERISA was designed to replace the patchwork of state and federal
laws that failed to adequately protect employees’ jobs and benefits by creating a
comprehensive and all-encompassing federal scheme to safeguard employee benefits.”).
193
Contra Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Wheaton, 42 F.3d 1080, 1085 (7th Cir. 1994) (“It is asking
too much of domestic relations lawyers and judges to expect them to dot every i and cross
every t in formulating divorce decrees that have ERISA implications. Ideally, every
domestic relations lawyer should be conversant with ERISA, but it is unrealistic to expect
all of them to be.”).
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Fortunately, Congress has specifically articulated these requirements,194
so this is not as cumbersome as it may seem. Properly drafted DROs will
reduce the likelihood of a plan administrator rejecting a DRO for lack of
compliance with ERISA. Equally important, when issuing a DRO, the
court should always reserve jurisdiction to make amendments if
necessary.
Finally, pension plan administrations need to be aware of the
responsibility courts have placed upon them through this judicial
deference. If not already in place, plan administrators need to establish
and clearly articulate policies concerning how the plan will treat DROs
received after a participant’s death. This, along with prompt action by
alternate payees who possess court orders that have been written by
judges familiar with QDRO requirements, will reduce the injustices that
occur when former spouses and children are denied the financial
support that ERISA intended to offer them. Will it take a Herculean
effort to resolve the problem? No, it will take a Herculean effort to
maintain order until the problem is solved.

194
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29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(C)–(D) (2006).

